Résumé Cet article soutient que la causalité au sens humien (mettant en relief la succession) qui fut la principale cible des critiques du Réalisme Critique de Bhaskar, demeure très présente dans le concept même de “mécanisme”. En effet, le concept de mécanisme implique une abstraction newtonienne du temps ignorée par le Réalisme Critique. Il s’agit cependant d’un problème plus large d’abstraction mécaniste, que cet article analyse simultanément sous l’angle du Réalisme Critique et de la discipline ayant pour objet l’étude des (...) mécanismes, la cybernétique. Comment des descriptions de mécanismes causals peuvent-elles se réconcilier avec leurs propres abstractions? En réponse nous proposons une dissolution du problème du temps au travers de l’expérience vécue. Par ailleurs, nous traitons également des questions liées à la pédagogie de l’enseignement des abstractions, à la mise au point de nouveaux contextes d’interaction et au rôle des technologies dans la mise en place des contextes ludiques. Enfin, nous dégageons des implications plus profondes pour la recherche réaliste, et soulignons la nécessité de traiter conjointement les problèmes d’abstraction et les problèmes pédagogiques et technologiques. (shrink)

L’article présente le concept de déductibilité que Bolzano introduit dans sa Wissenscahftslehre, indique quelques traits caractéristiques en vertu desquels ce concept diffère de plusieurs conceptions contemporaines de la conséquence et examine l’affirmation selon laquelle il présente une forte similarité avec la conception de Tarski et la logique de la pertinence.The article presents the concept of deducibility which Bolzano introduced in his Wissenschaftslehre, points out some of the characteristic features in virtue of which it differs from many modern conceptions of consequence (...) and examines the claims that it displays a strong similarity to Tarski’s account and relevance logic. (shrink)

Questo articolo si interroga su ciò di cui i filosofi hanno parlato, o dovrebbero parlare, quando parlano di "una pratica". La questione è complicata per il fatto che, almeno in inglese, esistono diversi sensi piuttosto distinti della parola "pratica", in due dei quali "pratica" è usato come un sostantivo e in altri due sensi "pratica" è usato come un verbo. Tutti questi usi, sia nominali che verbali, sono in realtà ben distinti, ma chiaramente connessi, a ciò che interessa ai filosofi (...) quando parlano di "una pratica". In _Due concetti di regole_ John Rawls ha offerto una definizione di 'pratica' che ha influenzato le successive discussioni filosofiche su cosa significhi essere una pratica: «Uso la parola 'pratica' come una sorta di termine tecnico che indica qualsiasi forma di attività specificata da un sistema di regole che definisce posizioni, ruoli, mosse, penalità, difese e così via, e che dà all'attività la sua struttura. Come esempi si può pensare ai giochi e ai rituali, ai processi e ai parlamenti». La tesi centrale di _Due concetti di regole_ è che le regole consequenzialiste e deontiche (o norme) sono entrambe essenzialmente coinvolte nell'istituzione e nella valutazione delle pratiche. La tesi del presente lavoro, tuttavia, è che se ci si concentra sul processo di esercizio di una pratica per sviluppare e mantenere la capacità di occupare con successo una posizione in una pratica rawlsiana, si può vedere che Rawls ha sbagliato sia a identificare il carattere di queste norme sia a individuare i loro obiettivi. (shrink)

_Abstract_: The sciences achieved consensus amongst their practitioners through emancipation from philosophy. In the first half of the 20 th century, philosophers began to align themselves with science, and most contemporary philosophers call themselves naturalists. Epistemology was still largely considered a philosophical prerogative until Quine’s paper “_Epistemology naturalized_” (1969). Opinion is now divided. Ironically, the prodigious work that secured Jean Piaget’s reputation as a cognitive developmental psychologist was actually carried out largely in service of epistemology. Disillusioned with philosophical speculation and (...) with a background in empirical science (Piaget trained as a biologist), Piaget conceived a method based on psychological and historical evidence to investigate epistemological questions scientifically. In this paper, I outline his genetic-epistemological method and locate it in the discourse on naturalism. I conclude by classifying genetic epistemology according to Goldman’s classification of naturalistic epistemologies and by assessing it in the light of criticism typically levelled at naturalistic epistemologies, before highlighting some salient points for a future scientific epistemology. _Keywords_: Epistemology; Naturalism; Psychologism; Genetic Epistemology; Jean Piaget _Ritorno al futuro dell’epistemologia scientifica? Jean Piaget su scienza ed epistemologia_ _Riassunto_: Le scienze hanno acquisito credito tra gli addetti ai lavori emancipandosi dalla filosofia. Nella prima metà del XX secolo i filosofi hanno iniziato ad allinearsi alla scienza e molti filosofi si definiscono oggi naturalisti. L’epistemologia è stata considerata materia filosofica fino alla “_Epistemologia naturalizzata_” di Quine (1969). Qui le opinioni si dividono. Per ironia della sorte il poderoso lavoro che ha consegnato a Jean Piaget reputazione di psicologo cognitivo dello sviluppo è stato di fatto svolto largamente al servizio dell’epistemologia. Deluso dalla speculazione filosofica e formatosi nell’ambito delle scienze empiriche Piaget (che era un biologo di formazione) ha elaborato un metodo basato sull’evidenza storica e psicologica per dare risposte scientifiche a problemi epistemologici. In questo lavoro intendo illustrare il suo metodo epistemologico-genetico, collocandolo all’interno del discorso sul naturalismo. Concluderò discutendo l’epistemologia genetica in base alla classificazione delle epistemologie naturaliste proposta da Goldman e valutandola alla luce delle critiche tipicamente rivolte alle epistemologie naturaliste, prima di illustrare alcuni punti salienti per una futura epistemologia scientifica. _Parole chiave_: Epistemologia; Naturalismo; Psicologismo; Epistemologia genetica; Jean Piaget. (shrink)

Bastiat is widely acknowledged as the most effective advocate of free markets, but his status as an economist is widely denied even by prominent Austrian economists who share his literary style and support for liberty. In particular, his theories of value and exchange have been attacked as a labor theory of value. Bastiat is exonerated here from these charges and is shown to fully oppose objective theories of value and to fully endorse the gains from free exchange. In addition, Bastiat (...) viewed economics as a science based on deductive reasoning and he vehemently opposed the use of mathematics. He thus was an important precursor of the Austrian school of economics.Bastiat est très reconnu comme étant le défenseur le plus éloquent du libre marché. Cependant, son statut en tant qu’économiste est amplement nié, et ce, même par les économistes Autrichiens éminents qui sont en accord avec son style littéraire et sa défense de la liberté. En particulier, ses théories de la valeur et de l’échange, considérées comme participant de la théorie de la valeur-travail, ont fait l’objet de critiques. Cet article exonère Bastiat de ces critiques et démontre que ses théories s’opposent radicalement aux théories objectives de la valeur : Bastiat avait une compréhension parfaite des gains découlant des échanges libres. De plus, Bastiat envisageait l’économie comme une science reposant sur un raisonnement déductif et s’opposait résolument à l’emploi des mathématiques. En ce sens, il était un précurseur important de l’école Autrichienne d’économie. (shrink)

Comment une proposition qui affirme que a est fatigué le matin et n’est pas fatigué le midi peut-elle être vraie ? Bolzano soutient que toute proposition portant sur une chose contingente contient, dans la composante-sujet, la représentation d’un temps. Dans cet article, je reconstruis et évalue les arguments de Bolzano en les comparant à ceux de son adversaire principal, le tenant de la position selon laquelle toute proposition portant sur une chose contingente contient une copule renfermant la représentation du temps (...) auquel l’objet représenté par la composante-sujet a la propriété représentée par la composante-prédicat . La conception bolzanienne de la modification du sujet ne peut résoudre le problème logique de la persistance qu’en assumant que des représentations-sujets qui contiennent différentes représentations de temps représentent différents individus dotés de déterminations temporelles. Mais ceci engendre une nouvelle question : comment un objet peut-il avoir différentes déterminations temporelles sans pour autant changer ?How can we can truly say that a is tired in the morning, and not tired at noon ? Bolzano holds that every proposition about a contingent thing contains an idea representing a time in its subject-part. In this paper I reconstruct and assess Bolzano’s arguments for his view of propositions about contingent things, comparing them to those of his main opponent, the view according to which every proposition about a contingent thing contains a copula combined with an idea that represents a time at which the object represented by the subject-part of the proposition has the property represented by the predicate-part . Bolzano’s subject-modification view could only solve the logical problem of persistence by assuming that subject-ideas containing different ideas of times represent different particulars bearing temporal determinations. But this creates a new question : how can an object have different temporal determinations and yet not change ? (shrink)

This paper brings about a conversation between Schumpeterian and Polanyian perspectives on markets and their central role in the capitalist economy. For Schumpeter, markets were critical to the process of selftransformation of economic activity, but in his vision, markets as such were largely taken for granted. Markets enabled the introduction of new processes and products equally as well as rendering economic activities obsolete, with the entrepreneur and firm as agents of change, generating new combinations of activities and driven by the (...) creative power of knowledge. Innovation and markets are jointly the engines of endogenous growth. For Karl Polanyi, by contrast, although markets were the central feature of the capitalist economy from the beginning of the nineteenth century, his main interest is the constant impulse for markets as institutions to expand into every aspect of social life and the countermovement of regulation to restrain what he sees as their essentially destructive nature. His focus is therefore on markets as instituted economic processes, driven by the double movement of regulation and de-regulation. He scarcely considers innovation in production or consumption, concentrating on institutions of exchange and distribution. The paper explores the two perspectives in order to ask the question that their confrontation raises: What is the relation between intra-market endogenous change and marketframework institutional change? To test out each perspective, a schematic “long-duration” empirical account of the United Kingdom food distribution markets is subjected to a Schumpeterian and Polanyian reading, and each is exposed for complementary deficits. A broader explanatory framework is sketched that proposes analysis of innovation in market institutions--especially processes exchange and distribution-- in combination with innovation in production and consumption. It is suggested that to explore the constant change of capitalist economies, these four economic domains each involve different orders of innovation and transformation that have complex feedbacks and interactions with each other. Rather than according primacy to one or other order of change, we require a complex causal account embracing multiple instituted economic processes.Cet article discute de la vision des marchés et de leur rôle central dans l’économie capitaliste selon Schumpeter et Polanyi. Pour Schumpeter, les marchés sont essentiels au processus d’auto transformation de l’activité économique, mais dans son approche il présuppose l’existence des marchés. Les marchés permettent l’introduction de nouveaux processus et produits et rendent en même temps les activités économiques obsolètes. Les marchés, avec l’entrepreneur et la firme comme agents du changement, créent de nouvelles combinaisons d’activités et sont dynamisés par le pouvoir créatif de la connaissance. L’innovation et les marchés sont conjointement les moteurs de la croissance endogène. Chez Karl Polanyi, en revanche, bien que les marchés soient un élément central de l’économie capitaliste dès le début du 19ème siècle, l’attention se porte sur le mouvement permament des marchés-institutions à s’étendre à tous les domaines de la vie sociale ainsi que sur le contre-mouvement de la régulation à limiter ce que Polanyi considère comme la nature destructrice des marchés. Son interêt se porte ainsi aux marchés comme des processus économiques établis, conduits par un double mouvement de régulation et de dérégulation. Il ne considère que rarement l’innovation de production ou de consommation, et se concentre sur les institutions de l’échange et de la distribution.L’article explore les deux visions afin de sinterroger sur ce que la confrontation des approches soulève comme question: Quelle est la relation entre les changements endogènes intra marché et les changements institutionnels de la structure de marché? Pour tester chacune des visions, un compte-rendu empirique sur longue période de la distribution alimentaire au Royaume-Uni est soumis à une lecture Schumpeterienne et Polanyienne.Un cadre explicatif plus large est esquissé et suggère une analyse de l’innovation des institutions de marché - particulièrement des processus d’échange et de distribution - conjointement à l’innovation de production et de consommation. Il est suggéré que pour analyser le changement permanent des économies capitalistes, il faut considérer les ordres d’innovation et de transformation de ces quatres domaines économiques qui connaissent des “effets de retour” ainsi des interactions. Au lieu d’accorder la primauté à un des ordres de changement, il est nécessaire de rendre compte d’une causalité complexe qui prend en compte des processus économiques multiples. (shrink)

There are two leading narratives of governance. One is a neoliberal one about markets that is inspired by rational choice. The other is a story about networks associated with institutionalism in political science. This paper argues that both rational choice and institutionalism rely on assumptions about our ability to readoff people’s beliefs from objective social facts about them, and yet that these assumptions are untenable given the philosophical critique of positivism. Hence, we need to modify our leading theories and narratives (...) of governance. We need to decenter them. The paper then explores the distinctive answers a decentered theory of governance would give to questions such as: Is governance new? Is governance a vague metaphor? Is governance uniform? How does governance change? And is governance failure inevitable? Finally, the paper explores some of the consequences of decentered theory has for how we might think about policy formation and democracy.Il existe deux histoires majeures de la gouvernance. La première, d’inspiration néolibérale, s’ intéresse aux marchés et se fonde sur les choix rationnels. La seconde s’intéresse aux réseaux relevant de l’institutionnalisme en science politique. Cet article soutient qu’aussi bien les choix rationnels que l’institutionnalisme se fondent sur des hypothèses concernant notre possibilité de déterminer les croyances des individus à partir de faits sociaux objectifs, et que néanmoins ces hypothèses sont insoutenables face à la critique philosophique du positivisme. A partir de là, nous devons modifier nos théories majeures ainsi que notre compréhension de la gouvernance. Nous devons les “décentrer”. Ainsi, l’article explore les différentes réponses qu’une théorie décentrée de la gouvernance peut apporter à des questions telles que : la gouvernance est-elle nouvelle? La gouvernance est-elle une vague métaphore? La gouvernance est-elle uniforme? Comment la gouvernance évolue-t-elle? Ou encore, l’échec de la gouvernance est-il inévitable? Finalement, l’article explore quelquesunes des conséquences de la théorie décentrée quant à l’élaboration des politiques et la démocratie. (shrink)

In response to recent calls to extend the underlying theories used in the literature :375–413, 2005; Craft in J Bus Ethics 117:221–259, 2013), we review the usefulness of social norm theory in empirical business ethics research. We begin by identifying the seeds of social norm theory in Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments, the Glasgow Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1759/1790) seminal work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Next, we introduce recent theory in social norm activation by Bicchieri and (...) compare the new theory to two theoretical frameworks found in the literature: Kohlberg’s Handbook of socialization theory and research, Rand McNally, Chicago, IL, 1969; in: Lickona Moral development and behavior, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York, 1976) theory of moral development and Cialdini and Trost’s The handbook of social psychology, Oxford University Press, Boston, 1998) taxonomy of social norms. We argue that the new theory provides useful insights by emphasizing the ability of situational cues and information to generate common expectations for social/moral norms. The theory is particularly useful for empirical research in business ethics because it gives both organizational and individual factors a role in motivating norm-based behavior. To demonstrate this usefulness, we present examples where the theory has been effectively applied in experimental accounting research to generate new insights. We conclude by citing specific examples where the theory may prove useful in empirical business ethics research. (shrink)

BackgroundAlthough the Life-Sustaining Treatment (LST) Decision Act was enforced in 2018 in Korea, data on whether it is well established in actual clinical settings are limited. Hospital-acquired pneumonia (HAP) is a common nosocomial infection with high mortality. However, there are limited data on the end-of-life (EOL) decision of patients with HAP. Therefore, we aimed to examine clinical characteristics and outcomes according to the EOL decision for patients with HAP.MethodsThis multicenter study enrolled patients with HAP at 16 referral hospitals retrospectively from (...) January to December 2019. EOL decisions included do-not-resuscitate (DNR), withholding of LST, and withdrawal of LST. Descriptive and Kaplan–Meier curve analyses for survival were performed.ResultsOf 1,131 patients with HAP, 283 deceased patients with EOL decisions (105 cases of DNR, 108 cases of withholding of LST, and 70 cases of withdrawal of LST) were analyzed. The median age was 74 (IQR 63–81) years. The prevalence of solid malignant tumors was high (32.4% vs. 46.3% vs. 54.3%, P = 0.011), and the ICU admission rate was lower (42.9% vs. 35.2% vs. 24.3%, P = 0.042) in the withdrawal group. The prevalence of multidrug-resistant pathogens, impaired consciousness, and cough was significantly lower in the withdrawal group. Kaplan–Meier curve analysis revealed that 30-day and 60-day survival rates were higher in the withdrawal group than in the DNR and withholding groups (log-rank P = 0.021 and 0.018). The survival of the withdrawal group was markedly decreased after 40 days; thus, the withdrawal decision was made around this time. Among patients aged below 80 years, the rates of EOL decisions were not different (P = 0.430); however, mong patients aged over 80 years, the rate of withdrawal was significantly lower than that of DNR and withholding (P = 0.001).ConclusionsAfter the LST Decision Act was enforced in Korea, a DNR order was still common in EOL decisions. Baseline characteristics and outcomes were similar between the DNR and withholding groups; however, differences were observed in the withdrawal group. Withdrawal decisions seemed to be made at the late stage of dying. Therefore, advance care planning for patients with HAP is needed. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to address the problem of the relationship between translation and art by relying on F. Hölderlin’s and W. Benjamin’s theories of translation. These theories, which at first appear to be opposed, are actually very close since they discuss both art and translation as marked by a linguistic and theoretical renunciation. In the first section, I demonstrate in what sense this relationship is fundamental for an aesthetic consideration of translation. The second section discusses the two (...) main reasons for the divergence between art and translation, focusing especially on the philosophical limitations of Hölderlin’s theory as indicated in Benjamin’s The task of the translator. In the third section, I deal with the commonalities of the two theories, which are both marked by the notion of linguistic failure. I argue that Benjamin’s juvenile essay On language as such can be approached from a confrontation with Hölderlin’s lyric Patmos. In the fourth and last section, I conclude that the concept of the linguistic renunciation can mark both Hölderlin’s and Benjamin’s theories of translation. I finally argue that renunciation can be attributed to both art and translation, which are therefore intimately related critical activities. (shrink)

In this paper, we describe an interdisciplinary study between Latin and Mathematics, where Latin serves as a tool for inquiry, facilitating access to and reflection on the new mathematical concepts that emerged during the Scientific Revolution of the 17th and 18th centuries. By examining original texts in Latin, we trace the genesis of these concepts and their development through the creation of a new Latin lexicon tailored to express them. We analyze texts by Galileo and the Bernoulli brothers concerning the (...) brachistochrone problem, which marks the transition from classical mathematics to the new infinitesimal calculus that laid the groundwork for the Scientific Revolution. From an epistemological perspective, solving this problem—which requires the new tools of differential calculus—offers a significant example of the limitations of classical mathematics. The analysis of primary sources allows us to reconstruct the original thinking that led scientists to propose solutions, while also encountering an epistemological obstacle: the concept of the limit. Furthermore, analyzing the Latin texts reveals the construction and evolution of scientific language as it developed alongside the new mathematics. (shrink)

Introduction. The book is a study in Adam Smith's system of ideas; its aim is to reconstruct the peculiar framework that Adam Smith’s work provided for the shaping of a semi-autonomous new discipline, political economy; the approach adopted lies somewhere in-between the history of ideas and the history of economic analysis. My two claims are: i) The Wealth of Nations has a twofold structure, including a `natural history' of opulence and an `imaginary machine' of wealth. The imaginary machine is a (...) kind of Newtonian theory, whose connecting links are principles; provided either by `partial' characteristics of human nature or by analoga of physical mechanisms transferred to the social world; ii) a domain of the economic, understood as a self-standing social sub-system, was discovered first by Adam Smith. His `discovery' of the new continent of the economic was an `unintended result' of a deviation in his voyage to the never-found archipelago of natural jurisprudence. -/- 1. Imaginary machines and invisible chains: natural philosophy and method. The first chapter reconstructs Smith's views on the method in natural philosophy, presented primarily in the History of Astronomy (HA). The peculiar kind of semi-sceptical Newtonianism which permeates the essay is highlighted. Its reconstruction of the history of one natural science is shown to be based on the assumptions of Hume’s epistemology, and to lead to a self-aware deadlock. Smith's dilemma is between an essentialist realism and sceptical instrumentalism; the Cartesian presuppositions he shares with Hume and with the 18th century as a whole make it impossible for him to overcome his dilemma. The following chapters will show how, on the one hand, Smith's skeptical methodology encourages him in the enterprise to `carve off' a new self-contained discipline and how, on the other hand, his epistemological dilemma is reflected in the inner tensions of his moral and political theory as well as in a number of basic oscillations concerning the status of the new discipline. -/- 2. Chessboards and clocks: moral philosophy and method. -/- The second chapter reconstructs Smith's views on the method in the parallel field of moral philosophy, including the theory of moral sentiments and natural jurisprudence. I argue that The Theory of Moral Sentiments, when considered together with with the Lectures on Jurisprudence, where Smith's peculiar version of a `weaker' form of natural law is presented, wins special interest, not only for the history of ethics but even more for the history of political theory and the social sciences. The two most striking features of Smith's work in this area are highlighted. First, his effort at reformulating the `practical science' is a methodologically self-aware attempt at applying the Newtonian method to moral subjects. Secondly, this attempt ends in a stalemate as two distinguished kinds of normative order are introduced: one ultimate order of Reason, ultimately justifiable but inaccessible, and one weaker order of our `natural sentiments', to which we have empirical access, but which is so variable as to lack any ultimate value as a basis for grounding our normative claims. These two parallel conundrums may arguably account for the author's inability to publish during his lifetime both The History of Astronomy and the projected history and theory of law and government. -/- 3. Wheels, dams, and gravitation: the structure of scientific argument in The Wealth of Nations. -/- The third chapter provides the core of the book, dealing with the structure of the argument in WN. I argue that the main presupposition that makes the shift possible from a `natural history' to a `system' approach is the Newtonian contrast of `mathematical' with `physical' explanation; that is, Smith drops any discussion of the "original qualities" of human nature that could account for economic behaviour, while introducing, as `principles' for the system, a set of `hypothetical' statements of `observed' regularities in human behaviour and of `observed' super-individual self-regulating mechanisms. In bringing this presupposition to light, the coexistence of a teleological with a mechanistic approach is clarified; fresh light is shed on the notion of the invisible hand by a comparison of its occurrence in Smith with the occurrence of the same expression (until now overlooked) in the correspondence between Newton and Cotes. Finally, the peculiar semi-prescriptive and semi-descriptive character of political economy are highlighted, and the consistency of Smith's `impure' semi-prescriptive social science, when understood in his own terms, is defended against familiar charges with inconsistency and against even more familiar strained modernizations. -/- 4. Apples, deer, and frivolous trinkets: the construction of the economic. -/- The fourth chapter draws consequences from the third, examining how Smith's achievement in political economy, marking its transition to scientific status, carried a re-description of the phenomena, creating the comparatively independent and unified field of the economic. Smith's achievement is interpreted not as the `discovery' of an autonomous character already possessed by the economy out there, so much as a Gestalt-switch by which our perception of social phenomena is modified making us `see' the partial order of the economy as an isolated system. To sum up, the autonomy of the economic in social reality and the autonomy of the economic in social consciousness are shown to be two sides of one process. -/- 5. Concluding considerations: Political economy and the Enlightenment halved. -/- A few suggestions on the status of economic theory two centuries after The Wealth of Nations in its relationship to ‘practical philosophy’ are illustrated. (shrink)

В книге предпринимается попытка найти некий алгоритм объяснения, который позволил бы по-иному осознать многие явления, процессы в человек и обществе. Для всех тех, кто интересуется философией и психологией.

В книге предлагается оригинальная трактовка глобальной эволюции, раскрывается содержание концепции планетарной и универсальной эволюции, основных принципов и методов их изучения.

Monografii︠a︡ posvi︠a︡shchena tvorchestvu Petra Evgenʹevicha Astafʹeva (1846-1893), zamechatelʹnogo russkogo filosofa, psikhologa i publit︠s︡ista iz plei︠a︡dy mysliteleĭ kont︠s︡a XIX veka -- "zolotogo veka" russkoĭ kulʹtury. V knige detalʹno rassmotreny osnovnye dostizhenii︠a︡ P.E. Astafʹeva, svi︠a︡zannye s obosnovaniem spiritualisticheskogo mirovozzrenii︠a︡: ego uchenie o dukhovnoĭ lichnosti i svobode voli, paradoksalʹnai︠a︡ traktovka chuvstva li︠u︡bvi, originalʹnai︠a︡ kont︠s︡ept︠s︡ii︠a︡ "bessoznatelʹnogo", predstavlenie o vere cheloveka v sebi︠a︡ kak pochve estestvennogo bogopoznanii︠a︡ i t.d. V edinstve s filosofsko-psikhologicheskim ucheniem P.E. Astafʹeva rassmotrena ego publit︠s︡istika (vkli︠u︡chai︠a︡ novyĭ i gluboko aktualʹnyĭ variant "troĭstvennoĭ (...) formuly") i namechena vozmozhnostʹ metafizicheskogo ponimanii︠a︡ nat︠s︡ionalʹnoĭ prirody cheloveka. V prilozhenii︠a︡ k knige vkli︠u︡cheny dva ėti︠u︡da avtora, posvi︠a︡shchennye poni︠a︡tii︠a︡m narodnosti i sobornosti. (shrink)

t. 1. Putʹ dukhovnogo obnovlenii︠a︡ ; Osnovy khristianskoĭ kulʹtury ; Krizis bezbozhii︠a︡ -- t. 2, kn. 1-2. Nashi zadachi -- t. 3. Shleĭermakher i ego "Rechi o religii" : religioznyĭ smysl filosofii : tri rechi, 1914-1923 ; I︠A︡ bgli︠a︡dyvai︠u︡sʹ v zhiznʹ : kniga razdumiĭ ; Poi︠u︡shchee serdt︠s︡e : kniga tikhakh sozert︠s︡aniĭ ; Putʹ k ochevidnosti -- t. 4. Poni︠a︡tii︠a︡ prava i sily ; Obshchee uchenie o prave i gosudarstve ; O suchnosti pravosoznanii︠a︡ ; O monarkhii i respublike -- t. 5. (...) Osnovnoe Nravstvennoe protivorechie voĭny ; O sopotivlenii zlu siloi︠u︡ ; Statʹi, Pisʹma -- t. 6, kn. 1. O li︠u︡beznosti sot︠s︡ialʹno-psikhologicheskiĭ opyt ; Osnovy khudozhestva, o sovershennom v iskusstve ; O tʹme i prosvetlenii : kniga khudozhestvennoĭ kritiki, Bunin, Remnozov, Shmelev -- t. 6, kn. 2. O Rossii ; Russkie pisateli, literatura, teatr, muzyka ; Khudozhnik i khudozhestvennostʹ -- t. 6, kn. 3. O Rossii i russkoĭ dushe ; Genii Rossii -- t. 7. O bolʹshevizme i kommunizme ; Muchenichestvo t︠s︡erkovʹ v sovetskom gosudarstve ; Sovetskiĭ soi︠u︡z ne Rossii︠a︡ ; O nat︠s︡ionalʹnom prievanii Rossii ; Tvorcheskai︠a︡ idei︠a︡ nashego budushchego -- t. 8. Bolʹshevist︠s︡kai︠a︡ politika mirovogo gospodstva ; Vzgli︠a︡d vi︠a︡alʹ ; Kniga razmyshleniĭ i upovaniĭ -- t. 9-10. Dnevnik ; Pisʹma ; Dokumenty (1903-1938) -- [t. 10.] Pisʹma ; Memuary (1939-1954) -- [t. 11. kn. 1] Perepiska dvukh Ivanov (1927-1934) -- [t. 11. kn. 2.] Perepiska dvukh Ivanov (1935-1946) -- [t. 11. kn. 3.] Perepiska dvukh Ivanov (1947-1950) godov -- [t. 12.] Stat·i, lekt︠s︡ii, vystuplenii︠a︡, ret︠s︡enzii (1906-1954) -- [t. 13.] Kto my?; O revoli︠u︡t︠s︡ii ; O religioznom krizise nashikh dneĭ -- [t. 14. kn. 1.] Filosofii︠a︡ Gegeli︠a︡ kak uchenie o konkretnosti Boga i cheloveka : uchenie o Boge -- [t. 14. kn. 2.] Filosofi Gegeli︠a︡ kak uchenie o konkretnosti Boga i cheloveka : uchenie o cheloveke -- [t. 15. kn. 1.] Aksiomy religioznogo opyta : issleovanie -- [t. 15. kn. 2.] Aksiomy religioznogo opyta issledovanie -- [t. 16. kn. 1.] Mir pered propastʹi︠u︡ -- [t. 16. kn. 2.] Mir pered propastʹi︠u︡ ; Analiticherskie zapiski i publit︠s︡istika -- [t. 17.] Gitler i Stalin. Publit︠s︡istika 1939-1945 godov -- [t. 18.] Spravedlivostʹ ili ravenstvo? ; Publit︠s︡istika 1918-1947 godov -- [t. 19.] Russkiĭ kolokol : zhurnal volevoĭ idei [No special title]. (shrink)

[1]. Dnevnik. Pisʹma. Dokumenty (1903-1938) -- [2]. Pisʹma. Memuary (1939-1954).

Il'in's classic work is the most impassioned and cogent work by a Russian jurist on the rule of law. The product of nearly four decades of labor, which could not be published in the former Soviet Union, this revised edition places the work in the context of developments since its first English translation in 2013. The text is accompanied by one of Il'in's early and influential articles on law and power, a bibliography devoted to his life and work, and informed (...) introductory essays about his contribution to the rule of law dialogue, the origins and transformations of the concept of legal consciousness and the fascinating history of his treatise on that subject. x, 403 pp. Ivan Aleksandrovich Il'in (Доктор государственных наук) [1883-1954], sometime professor, Moscow Lomonosov State University, is one of the most widely-read legal philosophers of the twentieth century in post-Soviet Russia. William E. Butler is the John Edward Fowler Distinguished Professor of Law, Penn State Dickinson Law; Emeritus Professor of Comparative Law, University College London; and author of numerous works on post-Soviet legal systems, including Russian Law and Legal Institutions (3d ed.; 2021). Philip T. Grier, who has written extensively on Hegel and Il'in and translated Il'in's principal treatise on Hegelianism, is the Emeritus Thomas Bowman Professor of Philosophy and Religion at Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Paul Robinson is a professor at the University of Ottawa. (shrink)